I.

Introduction
Economic independence is an important indicator of the transition to adulthood. This chapter portrays the level of economic independence among young adults, aged 18 to 32, in seven industrialized countries. The snapshots are taken from household surveys conducted early in the 1990s. As such the paper is designed to paint a comparative picture of when, and if, young adults achieve economic independence. We examine men and women separately to compare outcomes by sex as well. Since our data are cross-sectional, we can only observe variations at a single point in time. We cannot ascertain trends overtime among young adults, or observe the way that individuals transition from youth to middle age over time. However, the cross-national variations we uncover help us to understand how work, family, and comparative income packages affect economic self-sufficiency.
The breadth of our database, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) presents an opportunity to examine young persons in a range of countries in the 1990s. To generalize our findings to other nations, our countries were selected on the basis of previous research on similar topics (e.g., Smeeding 1997; Smeeding and Ross 1999; Jäntti and Danziger 2000) and to coincide with the focus of this volume. Besides the United States (1994 data year), we selected one other Anglo Saxon nation (United Kingdom 1995); one Scandinavian country (Sweden 1995) ; and three large central and northern European nations (The Netherlands 1991; France 1989; and Germany 1994) ; and one southern European nation (Italy 1995) .
1 These seven nations paint sometimes similar, but more often widely divergent, experiences among young adults in attaining economic self-sufficiency.
We begin by presenting a brief overview of some of the different welfare state system theories that set the context for employment in the nations that we examine. The theoretical background will help us explain some of the different patterns of the transition to economic independence that we report in this chapter. A brief description of our dataset follows. We then introduce each of our measures of economic participation and describe the results for each measure in a cross-national context. Next we draw brief country-specific summary portraits in an attempt to draw some regional conclusions about patterns of economic independence among young adults in each nation. The final section of the paper assesses what we have learned and what topics and questions that deserve future research.
II. Youth and the Welfare State: Understanding Economic Independence
All youth face the challenge of a transformation from economic dependence to economic independence. Schooling choices, no doubt, have an important effect on the pattern and timing of this transition. 2 But regardless of school choice, every transition involves some mix of three important sources of support: market work; welfare state support and support for human capital building investments such as schooling and job training; and, familial support in cash and in-kind (living arrangements).
The focus of traditional comparative welfare state frameworks is on state and market interactions. Esping-Andersen (1990) clustered systems of social provision along three dimensions: the relationship between the state and the market in the provision of social welfare; the effects of the welfare state on social stratification; and the character of social rights. From his analysis of these three dimensions, he developed three welfare state regimes. Social-democratic states (The Nordic countries), emphasize universal access to benefits and full employment, have a strong state role in welfare provision, and integrate economic and social policy. In conservative-corporatist countries (like Germany, France, Italy, and The Netherlands), social insurance dominates and financial contributions determine benefit receipt. The state provides social services only in the case of family "failures." Countries in this cluster tend to preserve class and status stratification. Finally, liberal welfare states (United States, Canada, and Australia) are characterized by a strong emphasis on free markets, with state intervention primarily in the case of market "failures." Benefit eligibility is primarily based on economic need.
There have been many critiques of Esping-Andersen's work and the research it engendered. While employing gender-neutral terms many analysts argue that he has implicitly assumed a male standard and that female experiences differ across and within these states (O'Connor 1993; Orloff 1993 Orloff , 1996 Sainsbury 1994) . Focusing on interactions between the welfare state and the market, many analysts like Esping-Anderson have also overlooked a major provider of social welfare-the family (Lewis 1993) . These elements also deserve our attention.
Unpaid, caring work constrains the choices of women within the welfare state (Hobson 1994 ). The limitations posed by the demands of home production, along with the implications of these limitations for economic and political participation, are not accounted for in traditional analytic frameworks. Moreover, in her review of comparative welfare state research, Orloff (1996) offered a new dimension on which to compare welfare states: how benefits shape women's capacity to form and maintain autonomous households. This dimension should capture the ability of women to support their children in the absence of a male breadwinner. Fraser (1994) proposed two alternative social policy models: the universal breadwinner model and the caregiver parity model. The universal breadwinner model would remove gender specific barriers to formal employment. The caregiver parity model would remunerate women for their caregiving responsibilities. These two elements, gender and family, need also be added to the Esping-Anderson state-market nexus.
In summary, the welfare state literature suggests that our assessment of the transition to economic independence for youth focus on these critical elements: employment sufficiency;
welfare state assistance; and family support. They also suggest that women in these societies may make these transitions in a different way than do men. Each of these factors is investigated below.
III. Data and Measures
The database used to carry out this analysis is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, which now contains information on child poverty for 26 nations in 95 databases covering the period 1967 to 1997 (see LIS homepage at: http://lis.ceps.lu/index.htm). The LIS consists of a set of existing household income microdatasets which have been "harmonized"
(categories of income and demography are made consistent) producing output files which are more comparable than are the raw files. While the LIS process certainly raises the ratio of "signal" to "noise" in cross-national comparisons of income, poverty and economic well-being, some of the noise remains. Hence, footnotes on noncomparabilities that have been reduced but not eliminated still are worthy of note. Recent papers and publications on poverty, inequality and social protection using LIS include Smeeding (1997, 2000) , Jäntti and Danziger (1999) , Smeeding (1997) , and Kenworthy (1998) .
There are a number of ways to measure economic independence. For this paper we choose nine somewhat related measures, described below, that illuminate the welfare state theories mentioned above. These indicators fall into three broad categories: (1) economic independence through market work; (2) economic independence through market work and government transfers; and (3) relative economic status which combines the effects of market, state, and family. For each measure, we estimate the level of economic independence at a point of time averaged over eleven, overlapping, five-year age ranges (18-22; 19-23; 20-24; 21-25; 22-26; 23-27; 24-28; 25-29; 26-30; 27-31; 28-32) . This technique permits us to assess differences in patterns across ages at a given point in time. Results are presented separately for men and for women. We display our results graphically in Figures 1 through 9 and provide brief summary tables for each measure within the text. 3 The Appendix includes detailed information about how we measure income and poverty for our analyses.
IV. Descriptive Results
We begin by examining the role of market work alone, then progress to include state and family effects. While this analysis attempts to separate the various forces of employment, welfare state, and family; we cannot ignore the interactions amongst the three. The final set of analyses combine these effects into measures of household-based inequality. Until that time, we do not explicitly account for the living arrangements and marital status of young adults. In the early analyses, we are interested the effects of the market and state policy on the potential economic independence of young adults in the absence of their decisions about family formation.
4
Economic Independence through Market Work
Full-Time Work.
The first measure we use to identify young adults who are achieving economic independence is the percent that are working full-year, full-time. We define full-year as having a job for 50 weeks during the past year; full-time is equivalent to working 35 hours per week. Due to data limitations we can examine full-year, full-time work among only four of our seven nations (Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States).
The top half of Figure 1 shows the percent of young men who are working full-year, fulltime in the four countries. In all of these nations, men in our older age ranges are more attached to the labor force than the younger men. Hence, there is more within-country variation than across country variation. For each country the rate of increase is fairly steady, but that rate varies by country. Among young men, Germans have the lowest levels of full-year, full-time work in early adulthood. By the time they are approaching their thirties, however, German men have the highest level of full-year, full-time work. In contrast, young men in the United
Kingdom have the highest levels of full-year, full-time work during their late-teens and early twenties and lowest levels as they approach their thirties. By the end of our age range, level of full-year, full-time work among young men converges to around 67 to 69 percent, with the United Kingdom as an outlier at 61 percent. During the earlier years when many young-men are transitioning from education into the workforce there is a wider range of labor-market attachment among our countries. But by the end of the age range, we expect that national macroeconomic factors such as unemployment are the main factor behind the small differences that remain.
<insert Figure 1 about here> In contrast, the bottom half of Figure 1 portrays the patterns of full-year, full-time work among young women. Unlike the case with men, two separate patterns emerge from out four nations. Young women from both Italy and the United States generally increase their levels of full-year, full-time work through young adulthood. Young women from the United Kingdom and from Germany, however, increase and then decrease their levels of full-year, full-time work.
In both of these countries the maximum level of nearly 41 percent is reached during the 24 to 28 year range. German women have steepest increase and the sharpest decline in labor-force attachment. Of course, marriage and childrearing explain some but not all of these differences. Comparing the levels in Figures 1 and 2 , with exception of Italy, more young men earn enough to isolate them from poverty ( Figure 2 ) than actually work full-year, full-time ( Figure 1 ). This finding implies that wages are high enough in these countries for many men to be able to work either part-time or part-year and still earn enough to support themselves at a non-poverty level
Unlike the pattern of full-year, full-time work (shown in Figure 1 ), the countries diverge, rather than converge, over the age range studied. The two outliers among men are Italy and The
Netherlands. In Italy, most young men who work full-year, full-time do not earn enough to keep themselves out of poverty. Dutchmen start low, but due to their steep profile end up with the highest levels of self-sufficiency through earnings at aged 22 to 26 and beyond. In both Italy and the United Kingdom earning sufficiency is much flatter than other countries, especially in the older age ranges. However, the level of wages in the United Kingdom is higher than that in
Italy. Among the very youngest men, the United Kingdom offers the greatest initial promise of wage sufficiency, but by the time men reach their late 20's earnings adequacy falls below all nations but Italy. The fact that young Italian men do so poorly likely reflects the fact that labor market opportunities are fewer and less well paid, and that the institutions of the Italian labor market are likely to favor older men..
In the bottom half of Figure 2 , Dutch women show the most variation with steep increase up to age range 23 to 27 (similar to men) then a sharp decrease throughout the rest of the age ranges; Germany follows same pattern but peaking at a later age range (24 to 28). Similar to men, the sufficiency pattern for the United Kingdom women is relatively flat, starting highest and ending second lowest, with little variation throughout the age ranges. Like their male counterparts, Italian young women are less likely than young women from our other countries to earn enough to be economically self-sufficient. The other nations look fairly similar with young women experiencing only small changes in earnings self-sufficiency.
Overall the patterns of earnings sufficiency for both men and women up to the mid-20s are similar. At lower age ranges women and men who work display similar levels of economic independence. At older age ranges, however, men achieve much higher levels of economic independence as illustrated in the table below (and in Figure 2 ). Clearly men do better than women from market work alone as they move through these age ranges. Family Earnings Adequacy. Another important marker of the transition to adulthood is the formation of independent families. Out next indicator of the economic transition to adulthood is the proportion of young adults who are able to support a family of three with their earnings. (See also Duncan, Boisjoly, and Smeeding 1997) . This measure is similar to the previous measure; it compares the earnings of young adults to the poverty line for a threeperson household. We choose three persons because the implicit choice being made by both men and women here is the capacity to start a family with one earner (either male or female)
Percent of Young Adults Able to Support Themselves with Their Earnings (in percents)
supporting a spouse (partner in the case of cohabitation) and a young child. We assume that the poverty level of half of median income is the lowest level at which a couple would decide to begin a family based on earnings alone. State and family support could, of course, enhance this minimum level of support. for The Netherlands and Italy look essentially the same as in Figure 2 , but the levels differ greatly. The United Kingdom is again the flattest, but with a greater slope than in Figure 2 indicating that for some men, wage progression with age is greater than for others. French, Swedish, German, and United States men appear to have similar levels and patterns of market self sufficiency through young adulthood. Dutch men again show the most rapid pattern of earnings sufficiency growth by this standard.
Among women, levels of family earnings adequacy show less cross country variation, particularly at the youngest ages. Swedish, United States, and French women exhibit steady, although small, gains despite women's movement into prime childrearing years. Paralleling their own economic independence, young women form The Netherlands and Germany experience sharp decreases in their ability to support a family through market earnings alone once they reach the middle age ranges. Comparing women to men, the penalties associated with childrearing begin to tell in women. More women have decreasing earnings in prime childbearing years, in the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. Overall, women are less likely to be able to support a family than men through earnings alone. Earnings Inequality.
We also measure the degree of earnings inequality for young adults by comparing?among earners only-the 90th percentile of earnings to the 10th percentile of earnings, within our age ranges. This ratio summarizes the breadth of the earnings distribution. Ratios close to 1.0 suggest that the majority of the population have similar earnings, with high earners having similar salaries as low earners; a ratio of 6.0 indicates that a person in the top decile of the earnings distribution has a salary at least six times as large as a person in the bottom decile of the earnings distribution.
Among male workers, we find three sets of patterns. Earnings inequality among Dutch men go from highest to lowest, demonstrating a strong movement toward earnings parity by the age range of 24-28. German and United States men experience declining inequality. In the United Kingdom, Italy, and France, earnings inequality stays rather low throughout. By the time young men are age 30, earnings inequality in five of the six nations are tightly clustered in the 2.0 to 4.5 range for men, except for the United States at 6.1. This suggests that work patterns among men begin with high variance (due to schooling, wage inequality and other factors) before settling down to more narrow ranges of mostly full-time work with earnings differences related mainly to differences in wage inequality (see Gottshalk and Smeeding 1997, Table 1 ).
As one might expect, there is both less stability and less predictability of earnings inequality among women. Dutch women have patterns similar to Dutch men until age 23 to 27
when they flatten and then climb with rising earnings inequality at older ages. German and American women's earnings inequality follows the same general downward pattern as that of men, but with a slight rise in inequality at the end of the period. Earnings inequality for British, French and Italian women is lower than that for women in other countries, no doubt the result of childrearing and family leave and work patterns at these ages (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1998) .
Although the patterns of inequality experienced by women from these countries are relatively flat throughout the age ranges, the levels of inequality begin to rise in the older age ranges.
United States women have the widest level of wage inequality at all ages beyond 21 to 25.
Unlike with men, the earnings inequality for women in other countries does not converge to a similar pattern at older ages. Only French and Italian women have earnings inequality levels similar to their male counterparts, but only in France are the levels of earnings inequality similar. 
Economic Independence through Market Work and Social Transfers
Markets alone do not provide economic independence for all young adults. Welfare states can act to minimize earnings disparity and increase levels of economic self-sufficiency both within and across age cohorts by transferring income. Our second set of independence measures looks at the combined effect of taxes and public transfers on the ability of young adults to support themselves and to form an economically independent family. Again, we examine whether an individual could support either herself or a family of three with the combination of her net earnings (less income and payroll taxes) plus a prorated share of the household's total level of public transfers. 7 The role of the family in preventing poverty and low income is not captured in this analysis because we observe a mix of both young adults living alone (or with partners and with children) and those still living in the parental household. Hence, our poverty rate analyses come in the next section of the paper where we examine household level incomes.
Here we continue to focus on an individual young adult's capacity for self-reliant living.
Since we examine the effects of government programs, in conjunction with earnings, on the ability to support oneself through transfers, the natural comparisons are between Figures 5 and 2 where one can compare ability to support oneself; and Figures 6 and 3 where the bar is raised to the level of supporting a family of three. Comparing Figures 2 and 5 it is clear that the effect of government policy is generally to increase ones ability to live alone at a nonpoverty level in all countries and for both sexes. The net differences of government activity are largest in the youngest and middle age ranges and flatten out at the older ages.
As one might expect, there are substantial crossnational differences in net government support for young adults, and this differences vary throughout the age ranges. Although their ability to support themselves is lower than the ability of young men in other countries, Italian men benefit the most from social transfers. Netherlands and the United States governments provide the least to men in the older age ranges.
The high relative rankings of men in these countries are driven by the earnings of the men, not the net social support that they receive. women. In other words, governments in the countries we analyze do not transfer income between these age ranges or sexes in a way that influences relative within-country/across-agerange/across sex economic independence. Instead, social support serves to increase the economic position of young men and women across all the young adult age ranges, while preserving the general age and sex related portrait of economic self-sufficiency provided through market work. Moving to the higher level of economic sufficiency-ability to support a family of three with net earnings and social transfers?we find a much tighter pattern for men, but a wider variance for women once government benefits are added to earnings (compare Figures 3 and 6 ). Among women (compare bottom of Figures 3 and 6 ) the pattern is very different. As expected, women's ability to support a family of three is lower than men's at every age level.
With the exception of Sweden, the range across nations is closer at ages 18 to 29, but further apart at ages 26 to 32. The French, Italian and Swedish governments exhibit support of women after the 22 to 26 age range. In each of these countries, the net effect of government taxes and transfers increase the percent of women in the older age ranges women could support a family of three through earnings alone by more than 16 percentage points. There are some differences in these three countries at the younger age ranges. In Sweden women in the first three age ranges are net taxpayers, where as younger women in France and Italy benefit more from government transfers than women in the older age ranges.
Young women in Germany are net taxpayers in the age ranges bounded by 19 and 32. In other words, the likelihood that German women in these age ranges can support a family of three is lower when government taxes and transfers are included in their income than when the probability was calculated on their earnings alone. Dutch women are net taxpayers in the age ranges bounded by 19 and 30. For the most part, British women receive a small, positive benefit from government taxes and transfers. As with young men, the U.S. welfare state has little impact on a woman's ability to support a family of three (compare Figure 3 to Figure 6 ).
Across all of our countries, women are less able to support a family than are men. As they reach childrearing age, women's earnings are reduced and they must rely to a greater extent on both public and private transfers. In some nations the net effect of government is to exacerbate these differences. The next section looks at the net effect of the combination of public and private transfers, market income and taxes, and demographic decisions. That is, it examines economic status of young adults accounting for their living arrangements (interfamily transfers) measured at the household level. Thus, it captures the effects of actual differences in living arrangements, not just one's ability to support oneself, or to support a family of three.
Relative Economic Status
Economic independence, as operationalized above, tells us only one aspect of the relative economic-well being of young adults. Since our cut-off for economic independence is a relative poverty line, many of our "independent" young adults may still be economically insecure, living just above the poverty line. Moreover, some of our young adults who do not have the economic capacity for independent living may still appear to be well-off due to interfamily (or inter household) transfers and choices about living arrangements. In this last section of results we examine the actual level of living of younger adults, including family support as well as earnings and government.
We use three measures to describe the economic status of young adults. An individual is deemed middle or high income if her household has after-tax-and-transfer income equal to 70 percent or more of the median household's after-tax-and-transfer income for her country in the year of observation. As explained in the Appendix, we adjust household income for family size in order to compare incomes across households of varying sizes. We measure income inequality among young adults by comparing the level of adjusted household after-tax-and-transfer income at the 90th percentile of the income distribution within age range to the level of household aftertax-and-transfer income at the 10th percentile within the same age range. Finally, we examine the poverty rates of young adults. These poverty rates account for all of the disposable income within the household that the young adult resides.
Middle or High Income. The fraction of both men and women who achieve middle or high income (70 percent of median) are judged to be economically secure. Some combination of their own earnings, public programs (net tax-transfer effects) and the income of others with whom they live (parents, spouses, siblings, or friends) is enough to put them 40 percent above the half median income poverty level. With the exception of France, women do worse than men (Figure 7 , bottom panel)
particularly as one moves into the childrearing years (although the differences are smallest in the United States and The Netherlands). Throughout the age spectrum, a higher proportion of French and Dutch women achieve middle or higher income status than women in other countries.
Women in the United States are the least likely to become middle or higher income until the oldest age range when Italian women takeover the bottom rank. Income Inequality. Overall income inequality, as measured by the decile ratio, is generally lower for adjusted household income (Figure 8 ) than for earnings inequality alone (Figure 4 ). There are two obvious male clusters: the high inequality countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy), and the low inequality cluster (Germany, The Netherlands, and France). These groupings are consistent with what we know about national income inequality rankings from other studies (e.g., Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997) and they remain steady across the age ranges.
Percent of Young Adults
There is greater overall income inequality among young women (Figure 8, bottom 
V. Country Specific Discussion
Thus far we have assessed information in a cross-country basis. The other chapters in this volume do a more thorough job illuminating national stories. And here we do find some interesting national pictures amongst the comparative charts. In general, French, Dutch, and, to the extent measurable, Swedish youth seem to encounter the least inequality, the least poverty, and the most stable economic patterns of the nations shown, both for men and women. We believe that their strong welfare states provide at least adequate minimal levels of support for both sexes as they transition from youth to adulthood. German and British youth have more varying levels of support-finding themselves within the range of the other nations in almost every age group and within almost all comparative dimensions. "Age" (from 20 to 30 years) seems to have little to do changing poverty, inequality or earnings ability for British youth, with women almost always doing more poorly than men. German youth show a more varied pattern, but still with women doing least well. United States youth exhibit the most poverty and the most inequality at younger ages, but without the advantage of having the highest chance to be middle or high income. Clearly many American youth experience a relatively insecure transition to adulthood as for as these data can tell us. Italian men and women show the greatest differences in our measures of the transition to economic independence in young adulthood. In our measures of economic self-sufficiency that focus on market work or the combination of market work and government transfers, young Italians tend to rank at or near the bottom of our countries. In our measures that implicitly account for living arrangement choices, however, Italians fare much better, in a relative sense.. No doubt differences in patterns of living arrangements, and other factors reflecting the wide range of differences between Northern and Southern Italy are at play here (see Smeeding, Rainwater and Coder 2000) . The other chapters in this volume will also help the reader to flesh out these differences on a country-specific basis.
VI. Conclusions
The analyses in this chapter suggest that it is not easy to quantify how and when young adults achieve economic independence. Drawing the work of welfare state theorists, we examined the transition to economic self-sufficiency through three avenues: (1) market work alone; (2) the combination of market work and net government transfers; and, (3) the combination of market work, net government transfers, and family resources. Each of these avenues suggests a different interpretation of cross-national differences in economic selfsufficiency.
Across many of our measures of economic independence through market work alone, there is more within country variation, by both sex and age, than across country variation. The pattern of results suggest that young men continue to transition toward economic independence through market work throughout our age ranges (18 to 32). Young women begin on the same trajectory towards economic independence as young men. However, the trajectory either flattens out or begins to descend as women reach prime childrearing age. In all countries, young women are less able than young men to become economically independent through market work alone.
The overall effect of government policy is to increase a young adult's ability to live alone at a nonpoverty level in all countries and for both sexes. Government policy tends to increase cross-national variation among women, particularly in the older age ranges. The ability to support a family is affected more by government transfers than the ability to support one's self.
In Germany and The Netherlands, the net effect of government tax and transfer policy, when added to market work alone, reduces the ability of young adults to support a family. In some countries, social support reduces the age and sex differences in economic independence.
However, across all countries, the age and sex patterns of the transition to economic independence determined through market work alone dominate.
The The data that we present in this chapter illustrate interesting comparative patterns, not only across the various nations, but also between men and women within each nation. The economic heterogeneity between the sexes is no doubt a by-product of national differences in living arrangements, childbearing, and economic differences. School attendance may also be a factor here. The roles of both family (particularly in terms of supported living arrangements) and state (in terms of support for living alone) are difficult to disentangle. Both provide support to young adults and both vary significantly across nations. While these differences play out in interesting ways, they provide only hints at the economic and social forces which affect young men and young women in these rich nations.
Future researchers on these topics might begin with our cross-sectional analyses and then move to a comparative dynamic comparison of these transitions using household panel microdata. Currently these data exist for several nations, and especially for the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Following young adults as they transition from basic education to full-time work and economic independence, including differences by gender, higher education, choices, fertility, and place of residence should rank high on the list of future research priorities for cross-national panel dataset users.
Appendix: Concepts, Measures, and Data Details
The snapshot we take is based on a number of choices. Luckily the database we employ, LIS, permits this choices. In this appendix we describe our concepts and choices for poverty measurement and measuring economic status. These are important for understanding the results in the main body of the paper.
Concepts and Measures: Equivalence Scales, Poverty, and Income Measures
The measurement of economic poverty in all nations, rich or poor, involves the calculation of economic well-being (or resources) relative to needs. Economic well-being refers to the material resources available to households. The concern with these resources is not with material consumption itself but rather with the capabilities they give household members to participation in these activities produces a particular level of well-being (Rainwater 1990; Coleman and Rainwater 1978) . Measurement of these capabilities differs according to the context in which one chooses to measure them, particularly within rich nations as compared to within poor nations, and perhaps also particularly among younger persons who have not yet totally separated from their parents.
All advanced or rich societies are highly stratified socially. Some individuals have more resources than others. The opportunities for social participation are vitally affected by the resources that the family disposes, particularly in nations like the United States, where there is heavy reliance on the market to purchase such social goods as health care, education, and child care services (Rainwater 1974) . Money income is the central resource in these societies. But there are still other important kinds of resources such as social capital (Coleman 1988) , noncash benefits, education, and access to basic health care, all of which add to human capabilities, but those are not measured by LIS money income and thus are a shortcoming of this paper. There are also many forces in rich societies which reduce well-being by limiting capabilities to participate fully in society: for instance, violent, geographically, and socially isolated neighborhoods, poor quality public education, and earnings and job instability increases economic insecurity in many rich countries. LIS also excludes these factors.
In rich societies, we argue that income-or the ability to consume-is the key measure of economic resources and the ability to avoid poverty. While income-consumption plus change in net worth-brings with it more complicated issues of period of measurement and life cycle considerations, it is a much more appropriate and, we would argue, more easily measured index of well-being for rich nations than is consumption (see Johnson and Smeeding 1998 on this topic). And so in rich nations, one measures poverty based on annual disposable money income.
Comparable information exists on money income by source, taxes paid, and certain kinds of transfers which have a cashlike character, such as housing allowances, fuel assistance, and food stamps, for the seven nations which we will investigate here.
While we are able to take into account income stipends for student support and similar cash benefits which help support the incomes of students, we collect information only on regular private transfers received by persons. Hence, a student (or other young adult) who is being supported by a parent or other relative not living with them, should report these regular private transfers as income. But our income concepts do not record one time gifts received by persons as income.
Unfortunately, we cannot take into account the major in-kind benefits which are available in most countries-for example, health care, education (subsidized tuition), housing subsidies other than those in cash, and the like. To the extent that the level and distribution of these resources is different in different countries, our analysis of money income must be treated with some caution. While their inclusion would be attractive to those interested in capabilities and their effects on longer term poverty (e.g., Bradbury, Micklewright, and Jenkins 1999), we do not have such data on hand. Earlier LIS-based studies indicated that while overall inequality and poverty comparisons were not much affected by these additions, we did find that the relative economic well-being of single persons and couples without children fell while those of the elderly and families with children rose due to these subsidies (Smeeding et al. 1993 ).
Equivalence Scales.
Households differ not only in terms of resources but also in terms of their needs. We take differing needs, due to differences in household size (and sometimes other factors such as urban-rural differences) into account by adjusting income for family size using an equivalence scale. The adjustment for household size is designed to account for the different requirements families of different sizes and different circumstances have for participating in society at a given level. Different equivalence scales will yield different distributions of well-being. Several studies in Europe, the United States, and Australia point to an equivalence scale which implies fairly large economies of scale in the conversion of money incomes to social participation among families with children and other larger family types (Buhmann et al. 1988; Bradbury 1989; Rainwater 1990) , and also for the aged (Burkhauser, Merz, and Smeeding 1996) . Because choice of equivalence scale may favor small versus large families, depending on which level is selected, we aim to find a middle ground value which is appropriate for measuring vulnerability for both large families (e.g., those young persons living with two or more relatives) and smaller units (e.g., single younger adults living alone). Buhmann et al. (1988) have proposed that disposable income be adjusted for family size in the following way:
The equivalence elasticity or "equivalence factor" E, varies between 0 and 1; the larger is E, the smaller are the economies of scale assumed by the equivalence scale. The various studies reviewed in the survey from Buhmann et al. (1988) and later Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995) make use of equivalence scales for analyses of per capita income ranging from E=0 (or no adjustment for size), to E=1 (which ignore all economies of scale). Between these extremes, the range of possible values is evenly covered. The reader should keep in mind that all money income estimates in the paper are based on adjusted or equivalent income calculated according to the above formula.
The obvious question is which measure of E to use for this study. Following Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995, especially chapters 2, 3 , and 7), we have selected an E value of 0.5, similar to that used by OECD (Förster 1994) , and Eurostat (Hagenaars et al. 1994) . For the most part, national rankings by overall poverty rates are not sensitive to the measure of E selected (Burkhauser, Merz, and Smeeding 1996; Smeeding 1997) .
Having defined equivalent income in this way, we determine the equivalent income of all households and all individuals in each country. We then examine the distribution of equivalent incomes of persons of any age in households in relation to the selected poverty line or level of economic well-being (economic status). That is we tabulate the percentage of persons of a given age who have given characteristics, where these person calculations are weighted by the number of persons of each type (all persons including children, adults, elderly), residing in each household type.
Poverty and Economic Status Measurement.
Needs can be measured two ways, an absolute definition and a relative definition. Relative poverty involves deciding on the income concept for relativity (median or mean) and on the fraction of adjusted income which signifies poverty. Absolute poverty measurement means locating the "absolute" poverty line and then converting that poverty line into national currency.
We rely here on a relative concept of poverty, the percent of persons living with incomes below one-half of median income. This income is in line with a well-established theoretical perspective on poverty (Sen 1992; Townsend 1979) . Such a measure is now commonly calculated by the European Commission (Hagenaars et al. 1994; Ramprakash 1995) , by the OECD (Förster 1993) and by other international groups. Only the British and one other major international study (Cantillion, Marx, and van den Bosch 1996) use a fraction of mean income as a standard, though Cantillion et al. use both mean and median income-based poverty rates in their study.
In fact, most studies use the "average" or median household as the point of reference, as do we. Using the average or mean income means measuring social distance from something other than the average household. Moreover, the decision to use one measure versus the other can lead to quite different results in poverty trends when inequality is changing. In the United
States from 1973 to 1994, the mean income grew 15 percent more than the median income, thus assuring that poverty measured relative to the mean grew much more than poverty relative to the median (Burtless 1996) .
Absolute poverty is more difficult to measure in rich nations because of our limited tools for converting one currency to another in purchasing power parity terms (Summers and Heston 1991; Smeeding, Rainwater, and Barkers 2000) . However, some have used both absolute and relative poverty definitions with LIS and have found roughly similar patterns to those found here (see Kenworthy 1998; Jäntti and Danziger 2000; Smeeding, Rainwater, and Burtless 2000) .
Our measure of poverty is the headcount, i.e., percent of households or persons with incomes less than one-half of the median income. We use only the headcount in this paper, although measures of poverty gap or more sophisticated measures of poverty such as the Förster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGH) (1984) and Sen (1976) index could be deployed. Were the purpose of this paper poverty measurement, would stress more measures of both absolute and relative poverty. However, poverty measurement is not the major purpose of the paper. And in practice, each of the other measures of poverty suggested above may have severe computational problems.
For instance, the poverty gap, FGH, and Sen indexes are all very sensitive to the accuracy of the income measure at the bottom of the income distribution. Differences in survey reporting, survey editing, and bounding of incomes by survey agencies may each drastically affect these measures of poverty as they in effect, artificially present different lower bound income figures across nations.
Defining Resources: Disposable Income and Earnings Inequality and Live Alone
Cross-national comparisons of poverty have focused primarily on the distribution of disposable money income after direct taxes (income and employee payroll) and after transfer payments. While this definition of post-tax and transfer disposable income is broad, it falls considerably short of the Haig-Simons comprehensive income definition, typically by excluding much of capital gains, imputed rents, home production, and in-kind income (including employment related benefits).
Ability to earn income at nonpoverty levels is also an important marker of economic independence. In this paper we examine earnings of young men and young women to determine their capacity for independent living. We do this by comparing their individual earnings (and their earnings plus their share of household government benefits) to the poverty level for one adult and three adults.
We also measure income inequality for individual youth earnings and for overall adjusted incomes employing one summary measure of inequality the decile ratio; the ratio of the earnings (or adjusted income) at the 90 th percentile to that at the 10 th percentile. Decile ratios are both an intuitive measure of social distance, and a measure of inequality which is less dependent on both the differential quality of data at the top and bottom of the LIS income datasets.
Endnotes
1.
We examine only West German youth here, excluding East Germany which was the German Democratic Republic from 1948 to 1989. Future waves of LIS data will include this population as well.
2.
Unfortunately, the LIS datasets do not contain information about school attendance. Since schooling status no doubt affects economic behavior and living arrangements, this is a shortcoming of the LIS data and hence of this paper.
3.
One important note below is that the structure of households in Sweden differs from that in other nations studied here. Hence, Sweden is not included in some of our analyses. For additional detail, see the Appendix on Concepts, Measures, and Data Details.
4
Of course, this is a somewhat arbitrary distinction since decisions about work effort and family formation are strongly tied.
5
On the other hand, an inability to find a job with higher earnings could dictate the living arrangements of the young adults in our countries. The young woman may want to move out of her parents' home, but she is unable to find employment that would allow her to afford such a move.
6.
See the Appendix for a detailed description of our choice of equivalence scale.
7.
LIS datasets only include social transfer information at the household, not the individual level. Since many social transfers are made to a household, LIS staff do not attempt to allocate social transfers to individuals within the household because of the difficulty of doing so for transfers other than social retirement benefits for older men and women.
8.
The obverse or one minus the fraction shown in Figure 7 , are those who are both poor and economically insecure. Note that Sweden is excluded from these figures because of the difficulty of identifying living arrangements of youth aged 18 and over. See the Appendix for more details. 
